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CHOICE OF LAW IN A MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
SETTING: THE DOMESTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Jack L. Allbritton*
The question of which law to apply - American or foreign - in a
maritime injury or death case has been a confusing one to judges
and lawyers alike. The issue arises when a foreign seaman or maritime
worker, either a "bluewater" merchant seaman or an offshore oil
worker, is injured or killed and he or his representative, lured by
generous and liberal damage awards and inspired by contingent fee
attorney contracts, brings suit in the United States seeking applica-
tion of United States maritime laws. Although the Supreme Court
in a trilogy of cases' decided between 1953 and 1970 established the
basic "substantial contacts" test for deciding the choice of law ques-
tion, application of the test on a case-by-case basis has differed widely,
with fundamental differences in philosophy developing among the cir-
cuits. The choice of law methodology developed in the traditional
"bluewater" merchant vessel setting, at a time when foreign offshore
oil operations and foreign amphibious oil workers were scarce.
In the "bluewater" seamen cases, an early but strong trend
developed in the Second Circuit favoring application of American
maritime laws whenever necessary to "effectuate the liberal purposes"2
of our laws and requiring only meager United States contacts with
the parties and occurrence, which were held to fall within the category
of "substantial contact." Other courts, particularly in the Third Circuit,3
have shifted the focus to a more reasoned analysis of the competing
national interests involved. With the development of American-based
multinational oil companies and the explosive growth of worldwide
offshore drilling, the foreign offshore oil worker began seeking
remedies under American maritime laws. The developing jurisprudence
has resulted in a definitive and marked distinction in the courts be-
tween the "bluewater" seaman and the offshore oil worker "seaman"
with regard to both the choice of law test to be applied and the ap-
plication of the "substantial contacts" test. In the offshore oil worker
cases, for American law to be applied, a much greater nexus between
the United States and both the foreign injury plaintiff and the con-
troversy is required than customarily has been required in the
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, Texas Bar.
1. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
2. Bartholomew v. Unse Tankships, Inc., 263 F2d 437, 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
3. Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1980);
DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
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"bluewater" seaman context. Indeed, factors deemed significant in the
choice of law question in the "bluewater" setting are deemed of minor
importance in the offshore setting and vice versa.
Primarily as a result of the worldwide offshore drilling explosion
and the widely publicized disparity between American injury verdicts
and foreign damage awards, the volume of foreign maritime injury
and death cases filed in the United States courts, particularly in the
Fifth Circuit, has been staggering. District courts, especially in Texas
and Louisiana, have been flooded with such cases, and as a result,
new decisions are appearing constantly, many of them finding their
way to the Fifth Circuit, which even now is addressing some of the
remaining unanswered questions.
RAISING THE ISSUE -PROCEDURAL
Uncertainty over the manner in which to raise the choice of law
issue exists, and courts and lawyers alike have confused the issue
with objections to subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a cause
of action, and forum non conveniens. Typically, the complaint alleges
a cause of action under the Jones Act or other United States maritime
law. When the defense is that foreign law, rather than American law,
would be applicable, the proper way to raise the defense is by asserting
in the answer, or a subsequent rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Subject matter jurisdiction is not at issue.
Typically, the choice of law question is presented to the court
in a pretrial motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), which is treated
as a motion for summary judgment if, as usual, matters outside the
pleadings also are presented to the court.' In other words, if the court
determines that the pleaded American laws are not applicable and
the plaintiff has not pleaded any other source of law for relief, sum-
mary judgment is proper. "1
However, more often than not the plaintiff will assert, at some
point in the litigation, an alternative cause of action based on foreign
law in an effort to remain in the United States forum in the event
4. See Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1015, 1020 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982); Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 613
F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (3d Cir. 1980).
5. Id. See also Zekic v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 680 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.
1982); Watson, Applicable Law in Suits by Foreign Offshore Oil Workers, 41 LA. L.
REV. 827, 828-30 (1981). For a different view, see Carlson, The Jones Act and Choice
of Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 49, 50 (1981), in which it is argued that failure to state a cause
of action "is not the proper defense, but it should in all cases be raised as a motion
for summary judgment."
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that he should lose his attempt to have American laws applied. For
this reason, the typical defense motion also includes a forum non con-
veniens plea, which becomes addressable only after the court deter-
mines that United States maritime laws are not applicable. In most
cases where the choice of law analysis results in a decision not to
apply American laws, there also will be abundant reasons why trial
of the case in a United States forum is inconvenient, thus providing
an adequate basis for the court to exercise its discretion to dismiss
the case. A foreign maritime injury or death case rarely is tried in
an American court under foreign law.'
DEVELOPMENT OF CHOICE OF LAW RULES IN THE SUPREME COURT
Any discussion of the choice of law rules in a maritime injury
case should begin with the fountainhead decision in Lauritzen v.
Larsen,' the first Supreme Court case to address the question in depth.
Larsen was a Danish seaman who entered into Danish shipping articles
aboard a Danish flag ship in New York. The vessel was owned by
a Danish corporation. While the vessel was in port in Havana, Cuba,
Larsen sustained an injury. He commenced litigation in a United States
district court alleging a cause of action under the Jones Act against
his Danish employer. Although his shipping articles were signed in
New York, they provided for the application of Danish law, and the
plaintiff was a member of the Danish seaman's union. The defendant
argued that the Jones Act was inapplicable and that Danish law clearly
controlled.
The trial court ruled that the Jones Act did apply, and the case
proceeded to trial on the merits before a jury, which granted a ver-
dict for the plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed the decision, but
the Supreme Court, in a 7-1 decision authored by Justice Jackson,
reversed the two lower courts and held that Larsen had no remedy
pursuant to the Jones Act.
The Supreme Court recognized that the Jones Act, if read literally,
could apply to any seaman on any vessel injured anywhere in the
world, but the Court concluded that Congress surely did not intend
such a result' and imposed some limits on the applicability of the Jones
6. This article will not discuss the subject of forum non conveniens further, as
it is a problem distinct from the choice of law issue. Other articles have treated the
forum non conveniens issues in one context or another. See, e.g., Paulsen & Burrick,
Forum Non Conveniens in Admiralty: The Availability of the U.S. Courts for Trial of
Maritime Cases Arising Outside U.S. Territorial Waters, 17 FORUM 1350 (1982).
7. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
8. An oft quoted passage of Lauritzen is pertinent:
If read literally, Congress has conferred an American right of action which re-
quires nothing more than that the plaintiff be "any seaman who shall suffer per-
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Act by utilizing a "factor analysis" test to determine whether the
Jones Act should be applied in a given case. This test, which has
become known as "the seven factors test," or the "seven immortal
pillars,"9 is still the basis for every choice of law decision in maritime
injury cases, although its application has created much confusion and
disparity.
The Supreme Court, in Lauritzen, indicated that historically seven
factors, either alone or in combination, generally had been conceded
to influence choice of law in a maritime tort claim. Those seven fac-
tors were (1) place of the wrongful act, (2) law of the flag, (3) allegiance
or domicile of the plaintiff seaman, (4) allegiance of the defendant
shipowner, (5) place of the contract, (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum,
and (7) law of the forum. The Lauritzen Court analyzed each factor
and clearly noted that different weight and significance would be
accorded to each factor. The law of the "place of the wrongful act,"
Cuba, was given minor weight, because a ship plies the waters of
the world over and the law to be applied could not be made to depend
on the fortuitous factor of where the ship happened to be at the time.,
Lex loci delicti, no matter how useful ashore, was of limited ap-
plicability to shipboard torts. On the other hand, the "law of the flag"
was considered by the Court of "cardinal importance" and as the "most
venerable and universal rule of maritime law," which generally should
prevail unless some heavy counterweight appeared.'" The ship in
Lauritzen flew the Danish flag.
The "allegiance or domicile of the plaintiff" also was considered
significant in Lauritzen, since "each nation has a legitimate interest
that its nationals and permanent inhabitants be not maimed or disabled
from self-support."" The plaintiffs "allegiance or domicile" was in Den-
mark. Likewise, the "allegiance of the defendant shipowner" was con-
sidered significant, because of a state's interest in governing the con-
duct of its own citizens upon the high seas or in foreign countries
when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed
thereby. While noting that this factor might be applied differently
sonal injury in the course of his employment." It makes no explicit requirement
that either the seaman, the employment or the injury have the slightest connec-
tion with the United States. Unless some relationship of one or more of these
to our national interest is implied, Congress has extended our law and opened
our courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere in the world in service
of watercraft of every foreign nation-a hand on a Chinese junk, never outside
Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal wording.
345 U.S. at 576-77.
9. See Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1969), affd, 398
U.S. 306 (1970).
10. 345 U.S. at 584-85.
11. Id. at 586.
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when the flag of a vessel and the allegiance of its owners were dif-
ferent, as in the case of a flag of convenient registration, the Court
was not faced with such a problem in Lauritzen, where both the owner
and the flag were Danish.
The "place of contract" factor referred to the place where Larsen
entered into his contract of employment or signed his shipping ar-
ticles with his Danish employer. That place happened to be New York,
but the Court did not attach significant weight to this factor, for as
in the case of the "place of the wrongful act," such factor was purely
fortuitous, since seamen customarily join ships fortuitously at different
ports around the world.
The sixth factor was "inaccessibility of a foreign forum," to which
the Court assigned insignificant weight, noting that such factor would
not be persuasive as to the choice of law issue, although it would
be persuasive on the question of whether or not a court should exer-
cise its discretionary jurisdiction to hear a controversy. Finally, the
seventh factor, the "law of the forum," was dismissed summarily as
warranting no consideration.
Thus, of the "seven factors" referred to by the Supreme Court
in Lauritzen, only the first five merited serious consideration, and
under the facts of that case, the "law of the flag," "plaintiff's
allegiance," and "allegiance of the defendant shipowner" were the
deciding factors resulting in the Court's choice of Danish law. All of
those factors pointed to Danish law, and the only American contact
with the parties or the controversy was that the plaintiff signed his
contract of employment and joined the ship fortuitously in New York.
This slight American contact was insufficient for the application of
United States law. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs argu-
ment that the Jones Act and United States law should be applied
as a means of benefitting seamen and enhancing the costs of foreign
shipping operations for the competitive advantage of American ship-
ping operations. Six years later, the Supreme Court again addressed
the choice of law question in the case of Romero v. International Ter-
minal Operating Co.1" In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Frankfurter,
the Supreme Court refused to apply the Jones Act and general
maritime law against a Spanish corporate shipowner and in favor of
a Spanish seaman injured aboard a Spanish flag vessel while the vessel
was in Hoboken, New Jersey. The Spanish seaman had been hired
in Spain. The Court held that the mere fact that the injury occurred
in United States waters was insufficient to justify application of the
Jones Act. The Court again rejected the place of the wrongful act
as controlling, and it relegated the plaintiff to his remedies in Spain,
12. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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since the district court had exercised its discretion and refused to
entertain this litigation between foreign nationals involving the
maritime laws of a foreign country. Romero further established the
principle that the same choice of law criteria to be used in determin-
ing whether the Jones Act is to be applied to a foreign seaman are
also applicable in claims brought under the general maritime law. The
Romero Court reiterated that the amount and type of recovery which
a foreign seaman may receive from his foreign employer while sail-
ing on a foreign ship should not depend upon the wholly fortuitous
circumstances of the place of injury. Romero, like Lauritzen, involved
a situation where the nationality of the seaman, the flag of the vessel,
and the allegiance of the vessel owner all coincided. Even so, four
justices dissented, with Justice Black, who also dissented in Lauritzen,
arguing that the Jones Act should be applied literally to "any seaman"
and, therefore, the choice of law question should never arise."
Lauritzen and Romero were "easy" cases, but the cases that fol-
lowed were not. In the same year that the Romero decision was rendered,
the Second Circuit decided the case of Bartholomew v. Universe
Tankships, Inc., which was later relied upon by many courts and
authorities as one of the leading cases in maritime choice of law ques-
tions and which also became the basis for an early trend toward liberal
application of the Jones Act and United States maritime laws to other-
wise foreign controversies. In Bartholomew, the Second Circuit applied
the Jones Act to a suit brought by a British West Indies seaman in-
jured in American waters on a Liberian flag vessel owned by a
Liberian corporation. Bartholomew presented the first "hard" case,
in which the plaintiff's allegiance, the flag of the vessel, and the
allegiance of the defendant shipowner did not coincide. All of the stock
of the Liberian corporate shipowner-employer was held by a Panama-
nian corporation, whose stock was totally owned by United States
citizens. All of the defendant corporation's officers were United States
citizens, and the principal place of business of the defendant was in
New York, as the defendant had only a sham office in Liberia. The
American contacts additionally included the fact not only that the in-
jury occurred in United States waters but also that the shipping ar-
ticles were signed in a United States port and the voyage of the vessel
began and ended in the United States.
The Second Circuit in Bartholomew undertook to restate the
methodology and the principles to be applied in choice of law cases.
The court eschewed a "center of gravity" or "place of the most vital
connection" approach as being inappropriate and concluded that the
13. Id. at 388-89.
14. 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
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test for whether or not the Jones Act is to be applied to a foreign
seaman injury case is whether there were "substantial contacts" be-
tween the transaction and the United States. The court noted that
there would be no need to consider and weigh the contacts that did
not exist nor to engage in the process of balancing one set of facts
that were present against another set of facts that were absent. Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, a court simply should ascertain those
factors or groups of factors which constitute contacts with the United
States and then decide whether these contacts are "substantial,"
vaguely defined as something "between minimal and preponderant
contacts."'5 The contacts are to be "weighed" or "evaluated" only in
connection with the determination of "substantiality." However, most
important to the analysis of the Second Circuit in Bartholomew was
the court's view that all such contacts and factors "must be tested
in the light of the underlying objective, which is to effectuate the
liberal purposes of the Jones Act."'" This "underlying objective" later
resulted in some clearly erroneous choice of law decisions and in
disagreement among the circuits.
Although the Bartholomew court considered the place of the wrong
being in American waters significant, it did not decide whether that
factor alone would be sufficient for application of the Jones Act. (In-
deed, the Supreme Court in Romero concluded that factor alone was
not sufficient.) Instead, the Second Circuit in Bartholomew placed ex-
treme emphasis on the "facade" of the foreign registration and the
American ownership behind it, and the court took the approach that
the foreign incorporation of the shipowner and the foreign registra-
tion of the vessel for convenience purposes clearly were intended to
evade the obligations of the ultimate American owners under
American law. The court found such an evasion attempt to be con-
trary to the liberal purposes of the Jones Act, which the Second Cir-
cuit viewed as a regulatory act designed to regulate the obligations
of American shipowners, rather than to provide a remedy to the
seaman-employee. Other factors in Bartholomew, however, further sup-
ported the court's decision, including the fact that the plaintiff,
although a citizen of the British West Indies, had resided in New York,
intended to become an American citizen, and, in effect, was considered
an American domiciliary.
Bartholomew proved to be an influential decision and a boon to
foreign seamen, for it was followed by a plethora of decisions jump-
ing on the bandwagon and furthering a trend toward liberal applica-
tion of the Jones Act and United States maritime laws to foreign in-
15. 263 F.2d at 440.
16. Id. at 441.
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jury cases, with the focus primarily on the employer and its contacts
with the United States. 7 Eleven years later, the Supreme Court hand-
ed down its third and last decision on the choice of law question,
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,8 which not only continued the trend
started by Bartholomew but also added fuel to the fire. In a 5-3 deci-
sion authored by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held that the
Jones Act applied to the claim of a Greek seaman injured in New
Orleans on a Greek flag vessel owned by a Greek corporation, more
than 95 percent of the stock of which was owned by a Greek citizen
who resided in the United States and managed the corporation from
a New York office. The Greek seaman had entered into his contract
of employment in Greece, providing for the application of Greek law
in a Greek forum. A Greek forum was accessible and available to the
plaintiff.
Of the seven Lauritzen factors, four favored the vessel owner's
contention that the Jones Act should not be applied. The vessel flew
the Greek flag, the plaintiff was a Greek citizen and resident, the
contract of employment was entered into in Greece, and a Greek forum
was accessible. The Supreme Court, however, rejected a mechanical
application of the seven factors test, noting that the seven factors
were not exclusive, and introduced an "eighth factor," known as the
"base of operations," which ultimately has become the most impor-
tant (and perhaps the most confusing) factor in any current choice
of law analysis. Much emphasis was placed on the fact that the defen-
dant shipowner, although a Greek corporation, had its largest office
in New York and was 95 percent-owned by a Greek resident of the
United States who managed that Greek corporation and the vessel's
business from the New York office. Additionally significant were the
fact that the ship made regular runs from United States ports to
foreign ports and the Court's finding that the vessel's entire income
was from cargo operations either bound for or from United States
ports. The Rhoditis case shifted the emphasis in the analysis from
the question of "who is a seaman" to whom the Jones Act is applicable
to the question of "who is an employer" to whom the Jones Act
applies. The whole tenor of Justice Douglas's opinion focused on a
determination of whether a particular shipowner-employer should be
held to be an employer for Jones Act purposes, a significant depar-
ture from the approach of the Court in Lauritzen.9 The Court, in
17. See Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A., 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping Corp., 491 F.2d 470
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974); Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067 (2d
Cir. 1972); Mattes v. National Hellenic Am. Line, S.A., 427 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Pandazopoulos v. Universal Cruise Line, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
18. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
19. Justice Douglas stated: "The Jones Act speaks only of 'the defendant employer'
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Rhoditis, noted that the significance of any one or more of the seven
factors enunciated in Lauritzen must be considered in light of the
national interest served by any assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction.
The Court focused on the fact that the vessel and her Greek owner
in Rhoditis were not "casual visitors" to the United States, -and despite
the foreign flag and foreign incorporation, a "cold objective look"'
at the actual operational contact of the vessel and the owner with
the United States resulted in the Court viewing the owner as an
"employer" owing Jones Act obligations. Citing with approval the Sec-
ond Circuit decision in Bartholomew, the Court focused on the liberal
purposes of the Jones Act and looked through the facade of the opera-
tion to determine whether the foreign employer, having extensive
business operations in the United States, was attempting simply to
escape the obligations of United States laws through the facade of
foreign ownership.
Justice Harlan authored a strong dissent21 in Rhoditis, criticizing
the majority for viewing the Jones Act as one creating a standard
of conduct on the part of shipowners, instead of viewing it as purely
a remedial statute, which it clearly was. Harlan would have focused
the inquiry on the question of "who was a seaman" to whom the Jones
Act applied, as it was thought the Court had done in Lauritzen. Justice
Harlan suggested that courts had "become mesmerized by contacts"22
and had lost sight of the primary purpose of Lauritzen, and, in his
view, the choice of law question should have been answered by
reference to the plaintiff's relationship to the United States. Follow-
ing Rhbditis, a host of lower court cases seized upon the reasoning
of Justice Douglas and focused on the "base of operations" and
"beneficial United States ownership" as being the primary factors to
consider in determining whether the Jones Act and American maritime
laws were to be applied in foreign injury cases.
POST-RHODITIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE "BLUEWATER" SETTING
The early post-Rhoditis decisions, mostly from the Second Circuit,
furthered the trend, sparked by Bartholomew and fueled by Rhoditis,
toward applying the Jones Act and United States maritime laws to
cases with little American connection. These courts suggested, and
came close to holding, that American stock ownership alone would
be sufficient to justify the application of American maritime laws to
without any qualifications. In Lauritzen v. Larsen .... however, we listed seven fac-
tors to be considered in determining whether a particular shipowner should be held
to be an 'employer' for Jones Act purposes .... " Id. at 308.
20. Id. at 310.
21. Id. at 311.
22. Id. at 318.
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an otherwise foreign injury case. In Moncada v. Lemuria Shipping
Corp.," the Jones Act was applied to the claim of a Honduran seaman
who met his death in Brazil while serving aboard a foreign flag vessel
owned by a foreign corporation. All of the defendant corporation's
stock, however, was owned by Americans, which the Second Circuit
indicated was "the most important" contact. The Second Circuit sub-
mitted that "American ownership alone [sufficed] to establish Jones
Act jurisdiction,"24 relying on dicta to that effect in the earlier Se-
cond Circuit decision of Bartholomew. But the court in Moncada did
not rely solely upon American stock ownership, for it also found that
the "base of operations" of the defendant shipowner was in the United
States, where the managing agent and the chartering agent of the
vessel were located. Straining to find sufficient contacts, the court
noted that all of the officers of the defendant corporation were
American citizens and that forty percent of the vessel's voyages began
or ended in United States ports. Thus, although the majority of the
contacts enumerated in Lauritzen seemed to favor the defendant in
Moncada, the Second Circuit noted that its task was not to weigh
or balance the presence or absence of contacts, but merely to deter-
mine whether those that did exist were "substantial."
The Moncada decision is a good example of the confusion over
the meaning of the term "base of operations," which was introduced
by Rhoditis. Uncertainty arose as to whether the "base of operations"
referred to the domicile or residence of the ultimate beneficial owner
of the vessel or to the place from whichthe day-to-day business deci-
sions of the vessel were made and directed or simply to that place
from which the vessel derived substantial revenue. The courts grappled
with this problem, but the early trend, as evidenced in Moncada,
focused not on the base of the "vessel" but on the place where the
ultimate beneficial owner might be found to reside.
In Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A., the Second Cir-
cuit applied the Jones Act and maritime law to the claim of a Greek
seaman injured on a Greek flag vessel on the high seas. The vessel
was owned by a Panamanian corporation. The trial court had dismissed
the suit, holding that the only American contact involved was the
presence of one of the defendants, which acted as the ship's agent
in United States ports. The trial court had concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to show that either the ship or the defendant was
controlled by American citizens. The Second Circuit reversed, noting
that all of the stock of the Panamanian corporation was owned by
23. 491 F.2d 470 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974).
24. 491 F.2d at 473.
25. 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977).
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an American citizen and that there was a United States agent who
had power and responsibility for booking and soliciting cargo, collec-
ting freight, fixing rates, and allocating tonnage. While noting that
American stock ownership alone may have been sufficient for applica-
tion of the Jones Act, the court further concluded that the ship, in
fact, was controlled from New York, as its "base of operations" was
in New York. Faced with the trend thus developing in the Second
Circuit, some lower courts predictably went to extreme lengths in
applying American maritime law to foreign injury cases in order to
"effectuate the liberal purposes of the Jones Act." For example, in
Mattes v. National Hellenic American Line, S.A.,"6 the Jones Act was
applied to the claim of a Greek citizen hired in Greece under Greek
articles to work on a Greek flag vessel, but who was injured in inter-
national waters while the vessel was on its way to New York. The
vessel owner-employer was a Liberian corporation. While noting that
application of the Lauritzen seven factors test alone would result in
holding that the Jones Act was inapplicable, the court in Mattes seized
upon the "base of operations" theory of the Rhoditis case and found
that the vessel had a "base of operations" in the United States mere-
ly because the passenger vessel had made 17 trips to the United States
in the previous two years and, although most of her crew were foreign,
at least two were United States citizens. Further stretching the point,
the court seemed to emphasize that 85 percent of the -vessel's
passengers were Americans and that the better part of her revenue
was derived from United States customers. Thus, these meager con-
nections were found to be "continuing and substantial business con-
tacts" with the United States and seemingly justified a finding of an
American "base of operations." The "liberal purposes" of the Jones
Act had been effectuated again.
As with most trends, too much of a good thing usually causes
the pendulum to swing and the trend to reverse itself. In Fitzgerald
v. Liberian SIT Chryssi P. Goulandris,"7 the Jones Act was held inap-
plicable to an action by a Greek citizen and resident against a Liberian
shipowner, whose stockholders were Greek citizens residing in Greece.
The vessel flew the Liberian flag. The court found no "major base
of operations" in the United States and that the vessel's base of opera-
tions, in fact, was in Greece. The mere fact that the plaintiff had joined
the vessel and signed shipping articles in Virginia was held insignifi-
cant. The only "connections" the plaintiff could prove with the United
States were that one of three original cosigners of the original ship
mortgage was a United States citizen, one of the Greek stockholders
26. 427 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
27. 582 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1978).
1983]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
owned land in and occasionally visited New York, and the Greek
stockholders had access to certain funds in New York. Such connec-
tions were held "not even close" and the case ultimately was dismissed.
Even the Second Circuit eventually drew in its reins. In Koupetoris
v. Konkar Intrepid Corp.," the Jones Act was held inapplicable to the
claim of a Greek citizen and resident injured off the coast of Maryland
while serving on a Liberian flag vessel owned by a Liberian corpora-
tion, the stock of which was owned by Greek citizens and residents
and whose principal office was located in Greece. The plaintiff hired
on the vessel in Greece. The plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to establish
an American base of operations by stressing certain American ties
and bank accounts that the defendant corporation maintained in New
York and by alleging activities of an American general agent which
handled the vessel's business in the United States. But the court found
that there was no evidence that the vessel owner was in fact con-
trolled or beneficially owned by Americans or that the base of opera-
tions was in the United States. Where the only American contact is
the place of the injury, "substantial" contact is lacking.'
The Second Circuit also refused to apply United States maritime
law in Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc.," which involved suits brought in the
United States by several families of German seamen who were killed
in the collision of their German flag vessel with the wreck of a
Panamanian vessel in the English Channel. The Panamanian vessel
was owned by Texaco Panama, a Panamanian corporation whose stock
was wholly-owned by Texaco, Inc. The suit Was brought under the
general maritime law of the United States and the Death on the High
Seas Act. Plaintiffs argued that the alleged failure of the owners of
the Panamanian vessel to properly mark the wreck of that vessel con-
stituted negligence. The plaintiffs claimed that Texaco, Inc., the parent
company, had supervised the search for the wreck from its New York
office. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the case, the Second
Circuit found that Texaco's alleged supervision of the search from
New York was not sufficient American contact to justify application
of United States maritime law to the case. Surprisingly, the court
completely avoided discussion of the aspect of American beneficial
28. 535 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1976).
29. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 383-84. See also Cruz v. Maritime Company of Philip-
pines, 549 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), holding Philippine law applicable to the injury
claim of a Philippine seaman injured on a Philippine flag vessel owned by a Philippine
company, where the injury occurred in a U.S. port. Although 29 percent of the vessel
owner's revenues arose from U.S. operations, and the owner had an office and an ac-
tive agent in the U.S., the court held that its principal base of operations was in the
Philippines, from where all major business functions were directed.
30. 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
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ownership based upon Texaco's stock ownership of its Panamanian
subsidiary, even though the plaintiff argued this point.
However, the case that did the most toward injecting reason back
into choice of law analysis was the opinion of the Third Circuit in
DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc.1 DeMateos involved a death action brought
by the representative of a deceased Panamanian seaman who was killed
aboard the Texaco Kenya, a Liberian flag vessel owned and operated
by Texaco Panama, Inc., a Panamanian subsidiary of Texaco, Inc. Rely-
ing upon the trend started in the Second Circuit, the plaintiff claimed
that Texaco Panama was a mere facade, that the Liberian flag of the
vessel was only a flag of convenience, and that beneficial ownership of
the vessel was in the United States corporate parent company, which
factors should be sufficient for the application of United States law. The
court rejected that contention and clarified that United States maritime
law would not be applied simply because of American ownership of the
foreign defendant corporation's stock. Nor did the fact that American
citizens owned the stock of the foreign vessel owner establish a "base
of operations" in the United States within the meaning of Rhoditis, when
in fact the vessel's operations were conducted and directed elsewhere.
The Third Circuit analyzed Rhoditis and Bartholomew and boldly noted
that, contrary to the approach of Bartholomew, the underlying purpose
in a choice of law analysis "is not to effectuate the liberal purposes of
the Jones Act,""2 but is to determine whether within the limits of due
process, the Jones Act could be applied to a given case. Addressing the
vague concept of "base of operations" in Rhoditis, the court focused on
that place from which the day-to-day business of the vessel was directed,
which was found to be either in Panama or in London, but not in the
United States.
In holding that ultimate American ownership alone was insuffi-
cient, the Third Circuit specifically departed from the expansive view
of the Second Circuit. Reason was reinjected into the analysis, as
evidenced by the following language of the Third Circuit:
It would be an extreme suggestion, we think, that American
law could govern relations between Texpan and the employees
31. 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
32. The Third Circuit stated:
With deference both to Justice Douglas and to Judge Medina, it would seem that
the underlying purpose for identifying and weighing factors is not to effectuate
the liberal purposes of the Jones Act, but to determine whether within the limits
of due process that Act could, and within the limits of assumed congressional
deference to the conventions of international law that Act should, be applied to
the transaction in question.
562 F.2d at 901.
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in its Panamanian gasoline stations because its stock was owned
by a multinational business enterprise incorporated in Delaware.
It is no less extreme to suggest that American law should govern
the relations between Texpan and its employees on vessels it uses
in the transportation of petroleum between Central American coun-
tries. Either suggestion is a variety of social jingoism, which
presumes that the "liberal purposes" of American law must be
exported to wherever our multinational corporations are permit-
ted to do business. Some of our laws, to other nations, may not
appear as liberal as the Jones Act appears to us, and extreme
applications of such an effort might well result in those nations
closing their door to such corporations, to their and our com-
petitive disadvantage.3"
Reinforcing the reverse trend begun by DeMateos, the Third Circuit
then decided Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp.,4 which
denied application of United States law to the widows of four
Venezuelan men who died in an explosion while working on a crew
launch in Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, where the only American nexus
was the fact that a Delaware corporation, Creole, a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Exxon, both employed the men and owned the vessel.
Creole's principal place of business was in Venezuela, where it had
an extensive crude oil operation. Creole clearly was not a sham cor-
poration. Although it maintained an export sales office in New York
and had an ongoing relationship with Exxon, its parent, Creole's ma-
jor business decisions were made in Venezuela.
Thus, in Chirinos de Alvarez, despite the fact that the defendant
shipowner-employer apparently owed its allegiance to the United
States by virtue of its Delaware incorporation, American law was not
applied. While Creole undoubtedly did engage in some business in
the United States, that business and Creole's relationship with its
parent company were held not to be substantial enough to consider
Creole's "base of operations" to be in the United States. The most
significant aspect of Chirinos de Alvarez was its analysis of the "base
of operations" factor. The decision clearly comprehended that the
Rhoditis "base of operations" referred to an actual operational base
of operations, that is, the place from which the day-to-day activities
of the business enterprise giving rise to the cause of action are con-
ducted, not merely that place where the ultimate beneficial owner
might reside or even the place where the defendant is incorporated.
The Third Circuit, in Chirinos de Alvarez, focused on the significant
interest of Venezuela in the matter, and some commentators have sug-
33. Id. at 902.
34. 613 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1980).
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gested that the Third Circuit has departed from the "substantial con-
tacts" test of Bartholomew, sanctioned in Rhoditis, in favor of a "balan-
cing of interest" analysis. 5 In any event, the Third Circuit refused
to become "mesmerized by contacts" and avoided a mechanical ap-
plication of the choice of law factors to reach a clearly correct deci-
sion.
If the logical trend of the Third Circuit had gathered much steam,
it apparently went unnoticed in, or was ignored by, the Fifth Circuit,
which rendered perhaps the most liberal and expansive opinion to
date, Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V." In Fisher, the surviving widow and
dependents of a Greek seaman killed on a Greek flag vessel in Beau-
mont, Texas, brought a wrongful death action under the Jones Act
and the general maritime law against the Liberian corporation which
owned the vessel and the Panamanian corporation which operated the
vessel. Both corporations were owned and controlled by Greek citizens
and residents. The vessel owners had just purchased the vessel, and
the vessel was on her maiden voyage under her new owner-a voyage
to Beaumont to pick up a load of grain for carriage to the Soviet
Union. The accident occurred on this first voyage. Apparently, the
only American contacts with this case were the facts that the acci-
dent occurred in an American port and that the plaintiff had flown
to that port to join the vessel, after having been hired in Greece.
Similar contacts clearly had been rejected as insufficient for applica-
tion of the Jones Act and American maritime law in a host of previous
cases, dating back to Lauritzen and Romero. However, the trial court
in Fisher concluded that the Jones Act and maritime law of the United
States would apply, primarily relying upon the fact that prior to the
accident, the vessel's entire service under its present ownership and
therefore its entire revenues arose from a base of operations in the
United States. The trial court evidently concluded that even though
this was the vessel's maiden voyage, the vessel had been purchased
primarily to service the American grain trade, which was equated
to a United States "base of operations" for the shipping and revenues
of the vessel. Curiously, the Fifth Circuit approved the choice of law
decision of the district court on this point, despite acknowledging that
the defendants had made an "extremely strong case for application
of Greek law;"37 the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the district court's
factual finding that the vessel had a substantial United States base
of operations was not "clearly erroneous." The opinion contained no
reference at all to the place from which the day-to-day operational
35. See text at notes 80-84, infra.
36. 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied & reh'g en banc denied, 636 F.2d 1107
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
37. 628 F.2d at 316.
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decisions of the vessel were made. The opinion seemingly indicates
that that place was in fact in Greece. The Fifth Circuit's decision in
Fisher is extremely hard to reconcile in light of what had been a trend
away from the liberal, expansive exportation of the Jones Act and
American maritime law under the early Second Circuit decisions. In
fact, the Fisher decision probably involved the weakest possible fac-
tual case for the application of American law. The case further resulted
in a scathiig dissent by Judge John R. Brown on the court's decision
to deny a petition for rehearing en banc. 8 According to Judge Brown,
the majority opinion in Fisher would have the following result:
Left to stand, the, opinion-decision opens the 19 District Courts
of the six maritime states of this Circuit and, by precedent, all
of the federal and state courts of the nation to injury/death claims
by foreign crew members against their foreign flag employers for
recovery under American statutory (Jones Act) or general
maritime law. All that is required to trigger this new burden on
beleaguered federal courts is the presence of the foreign flag
vessel to pick up cargo on the ship's sole voyage to an American
port. There need be no American direction, control or operation,
nor the presence of foreign nationals as domiciliaries running
things from an American base. 9
As noted by Judge Brown in his dissent, it is difficult to reconcile
the Fisher opinion with previous decisions of the Fifth Circuit in Avila
v. M/V Toluca," an unpublished opinion in which the Fifth Circuit
adopted the opinion of the trial court holding that doing business in
or trading at a United States port was not equivalent to establishing
a base of operations, and Merren v. A/S Borgestad,4' holding that the
existence of shipping agents in the United States did not constitute
a base, of operations.
Fortunately, the sting of the Fisher opinion in the Fifth Circuit
seems to have vanished as quickly as it appeared, for it has not been
the focal point of a new, expansive liberalism on choice of law, as
some may have thought. In fact, the decision now seems to have been
limited to its facts and generally is regarded as an aberration, being
a product of the "clearly erroneous" rule, rather than any expression
38. 636 F.2d 1107, 1108.
39. Id. at 1108.
40. No. 79-2921 (5th Cir. May 30, 1980) (unpublished opinion attached as appendix
to Judge Brown's dissent and found at 636 F.2d 1112). The Fifth Circuit affirmed per
curiam the trial court on the basis of the district court's order adopting the Memoran-
dum and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate. The Memorandum and
Recommendation also was previously unpublished.
41. 519 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 43
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
of the Fifth Circuit's view on the test to be applied in maritime choice
of law cases.'2
Recent decisions of the Fifth Circuit bear out this analysis. In
Volyrakis v. M/V Isabel,3 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court's
decision that American law was inapplicable where the place of the
wrong was in a United States port and the vessel made only periodic
visits to United States ports. The court distinguished the Fisher opin-
ion as being "inapplicable," because in Fisher "the vessel's 'entire
business activity prior to the accident' was in the United States.""
Although the development of the rules concerning choice of law
in maritime injury cases has been confusing enough in the "bluewater"
seaman context, treatment of the same issue in the context of the
foreign offshore oil worker "seaman," ostensibly under the same
Lauritzen-Rhoditis test, has added to the disarray, particularly in the
Fifth Circuit.
CHOICE OF LAW IN THE OFFSHORE OIL SETTING
In the last few years, the majority of maritime injury choice of
law cases have involved foreign offshore workers in the oil industry
working for American multinational oil companies and service com-
panies or their foreign subsidiaries. These workers are employed either
as part of the drilling crews of mobile offshore drilling rigs, such as
jack-ups and semi-submersibles, or as workers on special purpose off-
shore construction vessels, such as derrick barges and pipe-laying
barges or offshore tug and supply vessels servicing oil rigs in foreign
waters. The dockets of federal courts, particularly in Texas and Loui-
siana, literally are clogged with such cases.
Initially, the courts struggled with applying the Lauritzen-Rhoditis
choice of law rules to the offshofe oil setting and attempted to apply
42. Judge Tate's opinion in Fisher seems to suggest the Fifth Circuit merely was
approving the trial court's finding of a United States base of operations as not being
"clearly erroneous," rather than undertaking to expand the applicable test. Clearly,
Judge Brown, in his dissent on the denial of rehearing en banc, thought so, when
he noted:
Although nowhere expressed, the panel, oblivious to the existence of these three
Fifth Circuit opinions, seems to operate on the dubious theory that this Court
merely approved as not clearly erroneous the finding by the trial court that a
substantial base of operations was established. Where legal standards are
involved-as they must certainly be under Lauritizen and Rhoditis-they may
not be ignored, overlooked or watered down by any such distortion of the func-
tion of F.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
636 F.2d at 1111.
43. 668 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. at 868.
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the "substantial factor" test in a mechanical fashion, failing to take
into account the special considerations presented in the offshore dril-
ling context. Among the earlier cases, Rode v. Sedco, Inc.4 applied the
Jones Act and general maritime law primarily by taking the Rhoditis-
Bartholomew approach of piercing the facade of foreign flag and foreign
incorporation and applying American law where there were substan-
tial management activities of the foreign drilling rig owner taking place
in the United States."" The same traditional approach was taken in
Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc.,7 which held that the Jones Act
would be applied to the claim of a Portuguese seaman aboard an off-
shore oil service vessel operating in United Kingdom waters, where
the vessel, although flying the Panamanian flag, was beneficially owned
by American interests through a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary.
Taking the Bartholomew approach and piercing the "facade" of foreign
flag and foreign incorporation of a subsidiary, the Castanho court
ultimately concluded that through "stock ownership, interlocking direc-
torates, and control of assets" and for the purposes of choice of law,
the plaintiff was considered to be "employed by an American corpora-
tion on an American ship which, for all practical purposes, was
operated from a home office in Texas.""8 On the other hand, some
courts quickly determined that there were different considerations
in the offshore drilling context which justified applying the choice of
law rules in a different fashion. One of the earliest cases to make
45. 394 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Tex. 1975).
46. See also the unreported decision in Ramirez v. Zapata Offshore, No. 73-H-1239
(S.D. Tex. March 4, 1975), an early "offshore" decision applying American law to a
Spanish oil worker injured on a Panamanian flag drilling barge operating off the coast
of West Africa, where the employer and barge owner were foreign subsidiaries of
an American parent company. Clearly inspired by Bartholomew and Rhoditis, the court
found that American beneficial ownership alone was sufficient for application of the
Jones Act.
47. 484 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
48. Id. at 206. Interestingly, the plaintiff in Castanho simultaneously had brought
suit in a court of the United Kingdom, which court had attempted to stay the United
States litigation, albeit inappropriately. When the defendant moved the American court
to certify the denial of its choice of law and forum non conveniens motions for in-
terlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292 (1976) and sought an order to stay the
American proceeding pending outcome of the English litigation, the district court denied
both motions. The defendant, in a last ditch effort to appeal the choice of law question
prior to trial, filed a petition for mandamus in the Fifth Circuit seeking an order direc-
ting the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of forum non conveniens. This
effort also failed. See the opinion of the Fifth Circuit regarding the mandamus peti-
tion, Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc., 650 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1981). The trial court's
choice of law decison thus never reached the Fifth Circuit, for the case was settled
thereafter during the trial on the merits.
Compare Castanho with the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in De Oliveira v. Delta
Marine Drilling, 684 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982).
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such a distinction was House v. Santa Fe International Corp.,49 which
refused to apply American maritime law in a death action involving
a British diver and a mobile jack-up drilling vessel operating in the
North Sea, even though the drilling vessel flew the American flag
and was owned and operated by an American corporation. Despite
the fact that the American office of the American corporate owner
had complete control of all finances, personnel hiring, paying of wages,
and purchasing, where the day-to-day operations of the drilling ven-
ture were conducted out of the foreign office of the owner of the dril-
ling rig, which made the base of operations foreign, American law was
held inapplicable, since the British interests involved far outweighed
those of the United States.'
The traditional "bluewater" analysis given to the choice of law
problem and the weight to be assigned to the various Lauritzen-
Rhoditis factors apparently were not wholly applicable in the offshore
drilling context. An offshore drilling operation, for example, lacks the
fortuitous aspect found in a traditional merchant vessel situation,
which had resulted in a minor weight, if any, being given to such
factors as the place of the wrong and the place of the contract of
employment in Lauritzen. An offshore drilling operation has an air
of permanence as the drilling rig is usually on station for months or
even years at a time. Thus the place of the wrong is not fortuitous.
Similarly, foreign workers employed to work on the offshore drilling
rig and in the offshore drilling venture generally are hired in the same
locale, unlike the fortuitous place of employment associated with "blue
water" seamen. Similarly, factors such as the law of the flag, which
was considered of "cardinal importance" by the Supreme Court in
Lauritzen, should have less significance in the offshore drilling vessel
context, because once again, the need for a law on board ship that
does not change fortuitously from port to port is not present in the
offshore drilling context, because of the absence of fortuity. The
leading case which recognized the need for such different application
and set forth the rationale therefor was Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad
Oil Co.,51 which held that the Jones Act and United States maritime
law were not to be applied to death and injury actions brought by
Trinidad employees injured aboard an American flag semi-submersible
drilling barge operating off the coast of Trinidad, even though the
drilling rig was owned by an American corporation and the plaintiffs
49. 1978 A.M.C. 1899 (S.D. Tex.), modified, 1978 A.M.C. 2348 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
50. See also Villalobos v. Loffland Bros. Co., 507 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dos
Santos v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 495 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. La. 1980); Caie v. Oc-
cidental Petroleum Co., 1980 A.M.C. 880 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Iriah v. J. Ray McDermott
& Co., 1979 A.M.C. 1219 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
51. 632 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
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were employed directly by an American corporation headquartered
in California. The court specifically compared the interests of the
United States with that of Trinidad and concluded that the interests
of Trinidad far outweighed those of the United States in the controver-
sy. Although recognizing that if the case were a typical "bluewater"
merchant vessel case under previous authority American law prob-
ably would apply, the Ninth Circuit refused to mechanically apply
the Lauritzen-Rhoditis factors. The court noted the different considera-
tions that are applicable in an offshore oil drilling context and assigned
much more weight to those factors (such as allegiance of the plain-
tiff, the place of the wrong, and the place of the contract of employ-
ment) than traditionally had been accorded them in the "bluewater"
seamen cases. Perhaps most importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit
made it clear that the "base of operations" factor did not refer simply
to the corporate headquarters of the vessel owner, but instead referred
to the place from which the day-to-day operations of the business
enterprise giving rise to the liability were conducted. The Ninth Cir-
cuit thus placed itself in accord with the Third Circuit and its deci-
sions in DeMateos" and Chirinos de Alvarez." The Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion noted:
It is true that Santa Fe is based in Orange, California, and that
its Orange offices were involved in monitoring and controlling the
overall operations of Mariner I. We conclude, however, that the
more relevant and important base of operations for determining
choice-of-law in this case is in Trinidad. We thus follow cases that
have focused on the base of operations of the relevant business
venture rather than of the corporate owner of the vessel. This
is consistent with the injunction that we weigh the "connecting
factors between the shipping transaction regulated and the national
interests served by the assertion' of authority.."
54
The Ninth Circuit soon was joined by the Fifth Circuit in the case
of Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co.' In Chiazor, a Nigerian employee
was killed on a semi-submersible drilling rig operating off the Nigerian
coast. The decedent -had been employed by a Nigerian corporate sub-
sidiary of an American company, while working on a semi-submersible
rig being operated by a Nigerian corporate subsidiary of another
American company. The representatives of the decedent sued the rig
owner, an American parent company, arguing that the decedent was
a borrowed employee of the rig operator, a subsidiary of the American
52. See text at notes 31-32, supra.
53. See text at notes 34-35, supra.
54. 632 F.2d at 88 (quoting Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 582).
55. 648 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
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rig owner. As is customary in nearly all such cases, the plaintiffs
argued that the parent-subsidiary corporate relationship should have
been pierced, under an "alter ego" theory, so as to increase the poten-
tial American nexus with the controversy and to afford a basis for
arguing that the base of operations was in the United States. The
Fifth Circuit held that the trial court was correct in refusing to apply
American law to the controversy, notwithstanding the allegations that
the Nigerian corporate subsidiary was merely a sham corporation with
actual control emanating from the American base of the parent cor-
poration. The 'appellate court noted that where the day-to-day
operating activities were in fact conducted in Nigeria, it mattered not
that there was ultimate United States beneficial ownership or even,
that primary management decisions were made by American corporate
officers in America." In fact, the Fifth Circuit further concluded that
even under an assumption that the ultimate owner of the drilling
vessel was a United States corporate owner whose "base of opera-
tions [was] in the United States," the result would be the same.57 A
corporate base of operations is not necessarily that of the vessel, and
the vessel's base of operations, which is the place where the day-to-
day decisions are actually made and implemented, is of much more
significance in the offshore drilling context. -
Chiazor became the justification for dismissal of many cases in
the Fifth Circuit. Typically, the handling of a foreign offshore oil
worker case involved very tedious discovery and briefing concerning
allegations by the plaintiff of control over some foreign subsidiary
by an American parent company. The Fifth Circuit, in Chiazor, made
it unnecessary to engage in such painful exercises, for it assumed an
alter ego status and still concluded that American interests were not
furthered by applying American laws to an otherwise foreign con-
troversy. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Chiazor came as quite a sur-
prise in light of its earlier opinion in Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V.56
Even more surprising was that the Chiazor opinion was written by
Judge Tate, who also had authored the Fisher opinion. The two opin-
ions, written less than a year apart, are difficult to reconcile and
56. The Fifth Circuit stated:
We pretermit discussion of whether or not Transworld Nigeria was a legitimate
corporation with its base in Nigeria, or was a sham corporation with its actual
control emanating from Oklahoma City, for, even assuming a U.S. base of opera-
tions, the substantiality of the contacts herein with Nigeria warrants the non-
application of American law. We are unable to state, and Rhoditis in fact does
not command us to hold, that the shipowner's base of operations is the sole con-
trolling factor in a choice-of-law decision.
648 F.2d at 1018 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 1018 n.4.
58. See text at note 36, supra.
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represent both ends of a spectrum. Fortunately, however, the attitude
expressed by the court in Chiazor appears to have prevailed over
the extremely liberal and expansive view expressed in Fisher.
In a recent unpublished opinion in the case of Johnson v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co.,59 the Fifth Circuit followed Chiazor to the letter
in affirming the dismissal of the claim of a Nigerian seaman injured
on an American flag derrick barge operating off the coast of Nigeria,
even though the barge was owned by an American corporation and
bareboat-chartered to one of its foreign subsidiaries. The plaintiff, in
fact, was employed by a Nigerian subsidiary of the barge owner. The
plaintiff argued, on appeal, that the "base of operations" factor had
been misinterpreted by the district court, that the court should have
focused on the fact that the American parent company, owner of the
barge and parent of the Nigerian employer, had a substantial opera-
tion in the United States, and further that the foreign subsidiary was
but a mere alter ego of the American parent. The Fifth Circuit again
emphasized that even if the base of operations was considered to be
that of the American parent rather than that of the foreign subsidiary,
American law would not be applied.
The most recent Fifth Circuit decisions have furthered the trend
started by Chiazor. In Zekic v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co.,6" the
court affirmed the trial court's holding that American law would not
be applied to the claim of a Yugoslavian employee injured aboard a
jack-up drilling barge operating in Italian territorial waters, even
though the jack-up drilling rig was owned by an American corpora-
tion and the plaintiff was employed by an American corporation. Fur-
ther, in De Oliveira v. Delta Marine Drilling Co.,61 the court reversed
the lower court's decision to apply the Jones Act and American law
to the injury claim of a Brazilian worker injured on a drilling tender
tied to a fixed drilling platform off the coast of Brazil. The drilling
tender, a recently converted cargo ship, flew the Panamanian flag,
but it was owned by an American corporation headquartered in Texas.
The trial court, treating the action as a "bluewater" case, focused on
the American beneficial ownership and control and the American base
of operations; the court also relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit's opin-
ion in Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V. 2 The Fifth Circuit, however, con-
cluded that Chiazor controlled and that while the vessel's "profits
59. No. 80-2378 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 1981) (unpublished, 660 F.2d 495), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2270 (1982), affg per curiam & reinstating 1980 A.M.C. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
60. 680 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1982), affg 536 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. La. 1981).
61. 684 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'g 527 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
62. See text at note 36, supra.
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[wended] their way back to the United States, all the significant con-
tacts [centered] on Brazil." 3
De Oliveira is significant as it represents the first time since
Lauritzen that an appellate court has reversed a lower court's deci-
sion to apply American law in a maritime injury case. Heretofore,
the battles were fought mainly in the trial court, for once that court
decided to apply American law, the defendant either had to attempt
to persuade the trial court to grant an interlocutory appeal or had
to try the case on the merits before he could appeal the choice of
law decision. The latter alternative generally promoted settlement;
hence the erroneous choice of law decision never was appealed. 4 Even
in those rare cases in which an interlocutory appeal properly might
be granted, however, the "clearly erroneous" rule was likely to sup-
port the trial court in these essentially factually-oriented cases, giv-
ing the circuit court an easy manner in which to avoid making a hard
decision. 5 De Oliveira, therefore, is a refreshing opinion which should
prevent potential miscarriages in the trial courts which otherwise
might remain uncorrected.
In a recent opinion on the issue, Borralho v. Keydril Co., 7 the
Fifth Circuit again reaffirmed the stand it took in Chiazor. In Bor-
ralho, the court affirmed the district court's decision to apply Brazilian
law, rather than U.S. law, to the death claims of Brazilian survivors
of a Brazilian worker killed on a semi-submersible drilling rig operator-
ing off the coast of Brazil. On the strength of Chiazor and Zekic, the
Fifth Circuit again rejected ultimate American ownership and con-
trol as being "substantial contact," where the day-to-day operating deci-
63. 684 F.2d at 340.
64. See the discussion of Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc., supra note 48. Had
the district court in Castanho certified the issue for a 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) interlocutory
appeal, it is likely that the choice of law decision would have been reversed on appeal,
in hindsight view of Chiazor and De Oliveira. Instead, however, faced with the pro-
spect of a trial on the merits in the United States forum before it could complain
on appeal, the defendant settled the litigation.
65. That is apparently what occurred in Fisher v. Agios Nicholas V. See note 42,
supra.
66. Reliance on De Oliveira may be somewhat premature, however, because on
September 7, 1982, one week after the opinion was rendered, the court notified the
litigants in that case that its judgment as mandate would be stayed pending further
notification from the court, with no reasons given. Although there has been much
speculation on the meaning of the stayed mandate, such as the possibility that the
court would change its mind, or that a rehearing en bane may be in the offing, the
subsequent decision of the court by another panel in Borralho v. Keydril, infra note
67, appears to reaffirm the substance of the choice of law holding in De Oliveira. It
is curious, however, that the panel in Borralho failed to mention or cite De Oliveira
in any way.
67. No. 81-2436 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1983), rev'g on other grounds, 1982 A.M.C. 1316
(S.D. Tx. 1981).
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sions for the venture were made and conducted in Brazil. The court
specifically rejected the Second Circuit's position to the contrary, as
expressed in Bartholomew, "at least insofar as it concerns offshore
drilling platforms at long term fixed locations." 8
Chiazor definitely set the trend in the Fifth Circuit, and it is now
apparent that in the offshore drilling context, if there is a local opera-
tional base in foreign territory, a foreign plaintiff, and a, foreign drill-
ing locale, the chances are great that American maritime laws will
not be applied. Following Chiazor, a host of lower courts have chosen
foreign law in similar circumstances. In Gomez v. Sedco,5 American
law was held inapplicable in the case of the death of a Mexican rig
worker who was killed aboard an American flag drilling barge
operating off the coast of Mexico, where the barge was owned by
a United States corporation but under a bareboat-charter to a Mex-
ican corporation, even though the supervisory personnel aboard the
rig were American personnel employed by the American owner. Even
though payments under the rig contract were made to a United States
bank and the purchase of supplies and replacement parts for the drill-
ing barge was controlled by the American corporate owner from the
United States, Mexico was held to have the closest connection with
the transaction and, therefore, Mexican law was to be applied.
Similarly, in Paez v. Dan-Tex International, Inc.,70 the court dismissed
a Mexican worker's personal injury action arising out of his injury
on a drilling barge off the coast of Mexico, even though the operator
of the drilling barge was a Texas corporation. The current focus in
these cases is not on the corporate base of operations but on that
place from which the relevant business venture actually is conducted.
In Bailey v. Dolphin International, Inc.,71 American law was held
inapplicable to the case of a Filipino rig worker killed. aboard a
Panamanian flag drilling barge off the coast of Indonesia, even though
a Panamanian subsidiary of a Texas corporation, which provided some
supervision and control from the United States, both employed the
worker and owned the rig.72
68. Id. at 2205 (slip op.). The rig had operated off the Brazilian coast for 13 years,
ever since she had been built.
69. 1982 A.M.C. 252 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
70. 1981 A.M.C. 2821 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
71. 1982 A.M.C. 1174 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd & remanded on other grounds, No.
82-2060 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 1982).
72. See also Sumardiko v. Reading & Bates Exploration Co., No. M-79-68 (E.D.
Tex. Apr. 15, 1981) (unreported), in which American law was held inapplicable to the
death action on behalf of an Indonesian rig worker killed on a Venezuelan jack-up
drilling barge in the Java Sea, even though the rig was owned by a United States
corporation, where the day-to-day base of operations was found to be in Indonesia.
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Despite the obvious trend, however, some lower courts still appear
to be confused, perhaps understandably, by the divergent results and
the different applications of the rules governing the "bluewater"
seaman and the offshore oil worker. As previously noted, the trial
court in De Oliveira v. Delta Marine Drilling Co. 3 held that American
law applied in an action brought by a Brazilian citizen injured on a
drilling tender operating off the coast of Brazil, where the vessel was
owned by an American corporation headquartered in Texas. The trial
court, taking the "bluewater" approach and citing Fisher v. Agios
Nicolaos V, held that there were substantial and significant United
States contacts mandating application of American law. Presumably,
the court viewed the drilling tender vessel in De Oliveira as an
ocean-going "bluewater" vessel and applied the rules as if it were a
merchant vessel, even though it was a converted cargo vessel on its
maiden assignment as a drilling tender and was tied to a fixed off-
shore platform off the Brazilian coast. The Fifth Circuit, in reversing
the trial court, acknowledged that such a distinction might be made,
but it concluded that the vessel's status as a drilling tender tied to
an offshore drilling platform did not involve the element of transient
fortuity normally associated with the "bluewater" merchant vessel
cases; instead, the vessel's status was more closely akin to the more
permanent drilling vessels.
The De Oliveira case is a clear illustration of the conceptual dif-
ficulty in the application of the same choice of law criteria and rules
to ocean-going merchant vessels and special purpose vessels in the
offshore drilling industry. While the law may be fairly clear in the
case of the typical ocean-going cargo merchant vessel, as well as in
the case of the jack-up or semi-submersible drilling barges, a ques-
tion arises as to when a "vessel" falls into the category of a
"bluewater" merchant vessel as opposed to an offshore drilling vessel.
Every offshore drilling operation involves not only a drilling platform
or a mobile drilling vessel but also service vessels of different types.
In De Oliveira, the vessel was a converted cargo ship used as a drill-
ing tender. It was tied to a fixed offshore platform, and thus its func-
tion had just as much purpose and permanency as a jack-up drilling
barge or a semi-submersible drilling barge. The Fifth Circuit found
no justification for treating the drilling tender in De Oliveira different-
ly from a jack-up drilling barge.
Other cases involving special-purpose craft which service the off-
shore oil industry have not drawn the fine distinction that was
attempted to be drawn with the drilling tender in De Oliveira. In
Johnson v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,74 a derrick barge used in the
73. 527 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982).
74. See text at note 59, supra.
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marine construction industry was treated under the same rules as
an offshore oil drilling barge, and foreign law was held applicable
despite the fact that it flew the United States flag and was owned
by a United States corporation. The barge was engaged in a rather
permanent venture involving major offshore construction in the oil
fields off the Nigerian coast. In Fajardo v. Tidewater, Inc.,"5 American
law was held inapplicable to an action brought by a Spanish seaman
injured on an offshore supply vessel off the coast of Norway, despite
ultimate American beneficial ownership of the vessel through a parent
corporation and the fact that ultimate responsibility, management, and
control of the foreign subsidiary's operations were vested in the direc-
tors, officers, and personnel of the parent corporation headquartered
in Louisiana. The court in Fajardo found the important facts to be
that the vessel in question had never been in United States waters
and she had derived all her income from overseas employment. The
court further determined that the "cold objective look" demanded by
Rhoditis must be directed at both the shipowner and the ship.
Therefore, while the vessel owner in fact may have a base of opera-
tions in the United States, where the vessel itself has little connec-
tion with the United States, the application of American law is not
justified ."
Chiazor has caused a "domino effect" in the foreign offshore oil
worker injury cases, virtually eliminating the availability of United
States law to this class of potential maritime injury plaintiffs, despite
American ownership and control and an American base of operations,
all of which are now considered insignificant. At the other end of the
spectrum, however, the foreign "bluewater" seamen cases are still
viable and continue to emphasize American beneficial ownership and
an American base of operations as the most significant factors justify-
ing application of American laws. Reconciling these divergent results
has become increasingly difficult.
"SUBSTANTIAL CONTACTS" VERSUS "INTEREST ANALYSIS" -REAL OR
IMAGINED CONFLICT
Two apparent conflicts currently exist in the maritime injury
choice of law jurisprudence. First, a conflict has developed within the
"bluewater" setting between the Third Circuit on the one hand and
the Second and Fifth Circuits on the other. The Third Circuit em-
phasizes a more reasoned "comparative interest analysis," while the
75. C.A. No. 80-5094 (E.D. La. 1982) (unreported opinion of Schwartz, J.).
76. Compare Fajardo with Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 201 (E.D.
Tex. 1980), discussed in text at notes 47-48, supra. Such a comparison will vividly il-
lustrate how two courts can approach the same basic factual situation and achieve
divergent results.
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Second and Fifth Circuits adhere to a more liberal "substantiality"
test, focusing only on this country's contacts and ignoring the interests
of other nations, even though those interests may be paramount. Sec-
ond, a basic philosophical conflict exists between the choice of law
analysis employed in the "bluewater" cases and that employed in the
offshore oil cases, with a more substantial American nexus being re-
quired in the latter cases than in the former. Whether these conflicts
are real or imagined from a technical sense becomes important only
in connection with assessing the prospects of the Supreme Court grant-
ing certiorari to resolve the "conflicts." The conflicts in result, never-
theless, are very real from a practical viewpoint.
The first conflict pits the Second Circuit (Bartholomew) and Fifth
Circuit (Fisher) against the Third Circuit (DeMateos and Chirinos de
Alvarez).7 In "bluewater" cases, the liberal, expansive application of
American laws to foreign injury claimants, exemplified by Bar-
tholomew, Moncada, Antypas, Mattes, and Fisher, results from those
courts' efforts to "effectuate the liberal purposes" of American
maritime law by determining the "substantiality" of American con-
tacts in isolation, without regard to whether the interests of some
other nation outweigh the interests of this country. The source of
this approach was not the Supreme Court but rather the Second Cir-
cuit opinion in Bartholomew, which undertook a description of the
"decisional process" to be employed in a choice of law analysis and
was given apparent Supreme Court sanction when cited with approval
in Rhoditis 8 The Second Circuit in Bartholomew stated:
Accordingly, the decisional process of arriving at a conclusion on
the subject of the application of the Jones Act involves the ascer-
tainment of the facts or groups of facts which constitute contacts
between the transaction involved in the case and the United
States, and then deciding whether or not they are substantial.
Thus each factor is to be "weighed" and "evaluated" only to the
end that, after each factor has been given consideration, a rational
and satisfactory conclusion may be arrived at on the question of
whether all the factors present add up to the necessary substan-
tiality. Moreover, each factor, or contact, or group of facts must
be tested in the light of the underlying objective, which is to ef-
fectuate the liberal purposes of the Jones Act.'
The Third Circuit, first in DeMateos and later in Chirinos de Alvarez,
concluded that the teachings of Lauritzen, Romero, and Rhoditis did
77. See Watson, Applicable Law in Suits by Foreign Offshore Oil Workers, 41 LA.
L. REV. 827, 846-49 (1981); Comment, Striking the Colors: Choice of Law Under the Jones
Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 577, 590-95 (1981).
78. 398 U.S. at 309 n.4.
79. 263 F.2d at 441.
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not ignore the interests of other nations but, on the contrary, required
that a court "should determine the substantiality of the links to the
United States and the links to the foreign sovereignty" in order "to
discern in whose 'domain' the paramount interest lies.""° Although the
Third Circuit thus articulated a "test of substantiality," the test essen-
tially was a comparative interest analysis, with the result that
"substantiality" became the functional equivalent of paramount in-
terest. In other words, if a foreign nation's interest is deemed
"substantial," the United States contacts are not. Under this approach,
"substantial contacts" with the United States can not exist where the
foreign contacts are more "substantial" after appropriate weighing
and evaluation, contrary to the Bartholomew approach. Except for the
unfortunate citation of Bartholomew with approval in Rhoditis, there
is nothing in Lauritzen, Romero, or Rhoditis that suggests that such
a comparative interest analysis is inappropriate. In fact, as construed
by the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court clearly had called for such
comparison. The comparative interest analysis approach to the
"substantiality of contacts" question is the most reasonable approach,
especially when compared with the shocking result in Fisher v. Agios
Nicolaos V, which is an example of blind adherence to the Bartholomew
approach and an exercise in the "social jingoism decried in DeMateos."81
The second conflict is an outgrowth of the first, in that the choice
of law analysis now firmly established in the offshore oil setting clearly
has followed the path of the Third Circuit's comparative concept of
"substantiality." However, the rules as applied in the offshore cases
resulted in many contacts thought to be controlling or "super-
substantial" in the "bluewater" setting becoming insignificant in the
offshore setting. Factors such as an American flag, an American
registration, American ownership, American control, or even an
American base of operations, are no longer dispositive of the foreign
offshore oil case, even though the same factors in a "bluewater" case
probably would dictate application of American law.
The leading offshore oil cases, Phillips in the Ninth Circuit and
Chiazor in the Fifth Circuit, ostensibly are applying the same choice
of law test as in the "bluewater" cases, but the widely divergent
results suggest that either a different test is in fact being employed
or the test is being applied in a substantially different manner. In
Phillips, the Ninth Circuit, while giving lip service to the "substan-
tial contacts" test, clearly felt unrestrained in opting for a comparative
interest analysis approach, when rejecting the absolute approach of
Bartholomew. The Ninth Circuit in Phillips, like the Third Circuit in
80. Chirinos de Alvarez, 613 F.2d at 1246.
81. Dos Santos v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 495 F. Supp. 843, 847 (E.D. La.
1980).
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Chirinos de Alvarez, viewed a given transaction as having "substan-
tial contacts" with one competing nation or another, but not both,
and applied the law of the nation which had the "greater interest"
in having its laws applied to the controversy.2
Despite its absolutist approach in Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos V, which
is hopefully an aberration that is dying on the vine, the Fifth Circuit,
beginning with Chiazor, also has effectively used the comparative in-
terest analysis approach in the offshore setting.83 Although the test
still is acknowledged to be one of "substantial contacts," the court
is engaging in an interest analysis. Whether in fact a test is being
employed in the offshore setting which is different from that employed
in the "bluewater" setting, as some suggest," or whether the same
test is merely being applied differently, the conflict, if real rather
than imaginary, has not garnered the attention of the Supreme Court,
which consistently has denied certiorari in every such case to date.
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
Two issues remain uncertain in maritime injury choice of law
cases, particularly in the area of the foreign offshore oil worker. The
first is whether a distinction should be made in the choice of law
analysis in the foreign offshore oil worker context where the foreign
plaintiff is a "third country national,". neither a citizen nor a resident
of the place where the drilling venture is being conducted, nor a
United States expatriate. The second issue is whether American
citizenship automatically entitles a seaman, whether merchant seaman
or offshore oil worker, to application of American maritime law.
82. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit expressed its concept of "substantiality" in
these terms: "Substantiality is a relative term, and Lauritzen requires that we com-
pare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other na-
tions. . . .This is a comparative, and not an absolute, evaluation." Phillips, 632 F.2d
at 86. The ultimate inquiry was expressed in the following language: "The question
before us is whether the United States or Trinidad has the greater interest in having
its legal standards applied to these facts." Id. at 88.
83. The Chiazor court stated:
When viewed in this light, it cannot be said that the district court erred in
finding there were substantial contacts with Nigeria, rather than the United States.
...As in Lauritzen, . . .the overwhelming preponderance of the factors favor
the application of Nigerian rather than American law as governing the employ-
ment and accident in question.
648 F.2d at 1019. See also De Oliveira v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 684 F.2d 337,
340 (5th Cir. 1982), where the court reversed the district court's choice of American
law, because "the contacts with Brazil preponderate." Finally, see Borralho v. Keydril
Co., No. 81-2436 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1983), in which the court embraced the comparative
concept of substantiality by noting that "the contracts with the United States are
insubstantial when compared with those to Brazil .... "
84. See Bailey v. Dolphin Int'l, Inc., 1982 A.M.C. 1174, 1176 (S.D. Tex. 1982), ap-
peal docketed, No. 82-2060 (5th Cir. Feb. 5, 1982).
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In most of the leading decisions in the foreign offshore worker
arena, the foreign injured workers were citizens and residents of the
country in whose waters the drilling venture was being conducted.
The courts in these cases apparently placed some emphasis on the
fact that these foreign workers were hired in their home country to
work in the waters of their home country in a rather permanent drill-
ing operation, thus making it reasonable that their home law, rather
than the law of the United States, be applied to determine their rights
and remedies. More uncertain is the case of the third country national
employed to work for an American-based oil company in foreign waters
other than those of his home country. Bailey v. Dolphin International,
Inc.8" made no distinction and held that American law would not be
applied in connection with the death of a Filipino electrician killed
aboard a Panamanian flag drilling barge operating off the coast of
Indonesia. The drilling barge was owned by a Panamanian subsidiary
of an American company based in Houston, Texas. The plaintiff was
employed by the Panamanian subsidiary, having been employed in
Singapore, where a foreign office of the employer and rig owner was
maintained and from which place the day-to-day operational decisions
were implemented. While the American office of the parent company
monitored and maintained some supervision over the activities of the
drilling barge off the coast of Indonesia and, in fact, paid the wages
of the deceased Filipino worker on behalf of its Panamanian subsidiary
from Texas, a Chiazor-type analysis convinced the district court that
there were not sufficient substantial contacts to justify application
of American law to the controversy. Four different countries poten-
tially had an interest in applying their law to this case-the Phillipines
(to whom the plaintiff owed allegiance and which was the residence
of his widow and children), Indonesia (the place of the wrong and in
whose waters the drilling activity was being conducted), Singapore
(in whose jurisdiction the plaintiff was employed and from which the
day-to-day business of the drilling rig was conducted), and the United
States. The district court's choice of law analysis simply concluded
that United States law would not be applied. The court did not fur-
ther choose among the potential foreign laws. The court dismissed
the case on grounds of forum non conveniens, despite the plaintiff's
argument that there was no available forum which was more conve-
nient than the United States as each of the other potential jurisdic-
tions was somewhat inconvenient." The district court seemingly was
85. 1982 A.M.C. 1174 (S.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd & remanded on other grounds, No.
82-2060 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 1982).
86. The court dismissed the action on the condition that the defendants submit
to service of process "in an appropriate foreign court," leaving to the plaintiff the
determination of which foreign court that might be. 1982 A.M.C. at 1178.
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correct in viewing its function as determining only whether United
States law was to be applied in the first instance and, once concluding
that United States law was inapplicable, taking up the second and
distinctive issue of forum non conveniens. Only if the district court
should conclude that matters of convenience dictated retaining the
case in the United States court, should it have to determine which
of the competing foreign laws would in fact be applied.
Thus, while the case of the third country national presents addi-
tional problems, those problems are best dealt with as a forum non
conveniens issue and not a choice of law analysis, which focuses only
on whether or not United States laws should be applied. Bailey has
been decided recently by the Fifth Circuit. A recent Fifth Circuit deci-
sion, Zekic v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co.,87 affirmed a trial court
decision that American law would not apply in a case involving a third
country national, although it does not appear in the decision of either
the trial court or the Fifth Circuit that any substantial argument was
presented that a distinction should be made in such a case. In Zekic,
a Yugoslav plaintiff was injured off the coast of Italy on a drilling
barge. The district court concluded that Italian law applied, and
dismissed the action, with the Fifth Circuit affirming the choice of
law analysis but vacating in part and remanding the case only on the
question of whether the dismissal should have been conditional or
unconditional.
The second question, which has never been thoroughly presented
for decision, is whether American citizenship of an injured or deceased
maritime worker, whether "bluewater" or offshore oil worker,
automatically commands that United States law will be applicable,
even though all other traditional choice of law factors indicate that
application of foreign law is appropriate. In one of the early
"bluewater" seaman cases, Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark,88
American citizenship was held to be the most significant choice of
law factor in applying American law; the injured seamen were
employed in the United States to work on a foreign vessel and were
injured in foreign waters. On the other hand, United States residence
of an alien seaman generally has not been a significant factor in the
choice of law analysis."8
87. 680 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1982), affg 536 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. La. 1981).
88. 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966).
89. See Tjonaman v. A/S Glittre, 340 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1965) (United States residence
of alien seaman and signing of shipping articles in the U.S. held insufficient). Post-
accident establishment of United States residence also has received little attention
in the choice of law factor analysis. See Nunez-Lozano v. Rederi, 634 F.2d 135 (5th
Cir. 1980); Frangiskatos v. Konkar Maritime Enters., S.A., 471 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972);
Cruz v. Maritime Co. of Philippines, 549 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Helu v. Nauru
Pacific Line, 1978 A.M.C. 1996 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Rivadeneira v. Skibs A/S Snefon, 353
F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Although many courts have assumed that American citizenship
alone would be sufficient to justify the application of the Jones Act
or United States maritime law to an otherwise foreign controversy,
there is no sound reason for that assumption. Indeed, many cases
arising under the related forum non conveniens doctrine suggest a
trend away from "according a talismanic significance to the citizen-
ship or residence of the parties."9 A number of recent cases, not
necessarily maritime in character, have denied actions to American
citizens or residents in the United States, even against American
defendants, where forum non conveniens factors otherwise justified
dismissal." No sound reason appears why American citizenship, stand-
ing alone, automatically should entitle a citizen to application of
American maritime law in the absence of a further nexus with the
United States and the parties or controversy. Most courts will be
reluctant to turn away the American citizen seaman in a "bluewater"
merchant vessel case, particularly if he is a resident of this country.
However, there are many American citizens who clearly have
established a foreign residence while working in foreign offshore oil
fields around the world. Many of these Americans, for example, have
moved to Singapore and have set up residence there, effectively
avoiding United States taxation. Some rarely return to the United
States, even on vacations. A number of suits by these American
nonresident citizens are now pending. The courts soon will have to
decide whether or not their citizenship alone will be sufficient to justify
application of American law. There is nothing in Lauritzen, Romero,
Rhoditis, or any other case which clearly mandates application of
American maritime law solely by virtue of the plaintiff's citizenship.
On the other hand, with respect to the American citizen and resi-
dent who is recruited in the United States to work overseas for a
specific but temporary term and who does not give up his permanent
United States residence, courts are unlikely to deny the benefits of
the Jones Act and American maritime law. In any event, just as the
American flag no longer compels application of American maritime
law in a maritime injury case,' neither does American citizenship.
90. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
91. Id.; Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Farman-
farmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978); Abiaad v. General Motors Corp.,
538 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
92. The prior jurisprudence was to the effect that an American flag vessel
automatically carried with it the umbrella of American law. The Second Circuit in-
dicated as much in Bartholomew when it stated, "Yet could anyone doubt that if the
ship flew the American flag, without more, the Jones Act would apply?" 263 F.2d
at 440. See also Carlson, The Jones Act and Choice of Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 49, 61 (1981),
where it was stated, "Application of the Jones Act to any seaman aboard a vessel
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CONCLUSION
The development of choice of law rules in maritime injury cases
has seen trends from one extreme to the other, with some courts seek-
ing to expand application of American maritime law to otherwise
foreign controversies with minimal connections to this country, while
others have taken a clearly restrictive approach, applying American
law only where the interests of this country are paramount to that
of a competing foreign nation. While technically there may be no con-
flict and the same basic rules ostensibly are being applied, the basic
philosophy of the Second and Fifth Circuits in the "bluewater" mer-
chant vessel cases appears to directly oppose that taken by the Third
Circuit, while the philosophy of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in the
offshore drilling cases clearly opposes that view generally prevailing
in the "bluewater" cases.
While the time seems ripe for some clarification or assistance from
the Supreme Court to help guide the courts through these tricky
waters, the Court consistently has refused certiorari over the last
twelve years. Perhaps the Court's recent refusal to grant certiorari
in the offshore drilling cases of Phillips, Chiazor, and Johnson is a
stamp of approval on the distinctive approaches taken by those courts
in applying the traditional Lauritzen-Rhoditis choice of law analysis
to an offshore drilling venture clearly not envisioned when the rules
were first devised. Speculation will continue until the Supreme Court
agrees to hear one of these cases.
flying an American flag is beyond doubt."
While it still may be true that the American flag "bluewater" merchant vessel
cannot escape application of American law, it certainly has not been true, ipso facto,
in the case of special purpose vessels used in the offshore drilling and construction
industry, such as jack-up and semi-submersible drilling barges. See Johnson v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., No. 80-2378 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 1981) (unpublished, 660 F.2d 495), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2270 (1982); Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 632 F.2d 82 (9th
Cir. 1980); Gomez v. Sedco, 1982 A.M.C. 252 (S.D. Tex. 1981); House v. Santa Fe Int'l,
Inc., 1978 A.M.C. 1899 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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